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INTRODUCTION
The atmosphere maintains the balance of the global ecosystem
by regulating the temperature of the earth's surface and protect-
ing it from damaging ultraviolet radiation. Current scientific evi-
dence indicates not only that there has been a deterioration of
the ozone layer, the atmospheric stratum that provides protec-
tion against ultraviolet radiation and regulates much of the sur-
face temperature, but also that the build-up of greenhouse gas
concentrations may cause a progressive increase in global tem-
perature with significant potential ecological, economic and so-
cial effects.' Current estimates suggest that a doubling of carbon
dioxide levels in the next 50 to 100 years could increase average
global temperatures by 1.5 to 4.5 degrees centigrade.2 This in-
crease in global temperature, often termed "global warming" or
the "greenhouse effect," is thought to be related to the release
into the atmosphere of certain trace gases which have heat-
trapping qualities, and which, in high concentrations in the at-
mosphere, cause the heat radiating from the earth to be ad-
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in International Trade Law, 1997 at University of Arizona School of
Law. She has also earned an M.A. in Economics in 1996 at La Trobe
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1. See generally William D. Nordhaus, Economic Approaches to Green-
house Warming, in GLOBAL WARMING: ECONOMIC POLICY RESPONSES 39-46
(Rudiger Dornbusch & James M. Poterba eds., 1991).
2. See id. at 37. It is important to note that although climate simu-
lation models may vary, they have resulted in similar predictions. See,
e.g., NATIONAL ACAD. SCI., POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GREENHOUSE WARMING
19 (1991) [hereinafter NATIONAL ACAD. SCI., POL'Y IMPLICATIONS] (re-
garding the temperature range of possible warming in response to an
increase in carbon dioxide emissions).
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sorbed and retained.3 Many of these trace gases are also associ-
ated with ozone deterioration. 4 This strong interrelationship
between the greenhouse effect and the depletion of the ozone
layer suggests that when examining policies aimed at mitigating
global climate change, the regulation of substances that deplete
the ozone layer should also be considered.
The atmospheric trace gases predominantly associated with the
greenhouse effect are carbon dioxide (C0 2), chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs), nitrous oxide (N20) and methane. 5 Although CO 2 is a less
effective greenhouse gas, the sheer volume of emissions, and hence
atmospheric concentrations, make it the single most important con-
tributor to global warming. Recent evidence suggests CO 2 emissions
are responsible for fifty percent of the potential greenhouse effect.
6
CO 2 emissions are predominantly the result of the combustion of
fossil fuels. The question of curbing CO 2 emission is, therefore, par-
ticularly contentious, given the high level of dependence on fossil
fuels in electricity generation, industrial processes and transporta-
tion in the developed world. The top ranking countries in terms of
total and per capita emissions from 1960 to 1988 were the United
States, the former Soviet Union and China.7
Before the developed world can contribute effectively to major re-
ductions in CO 2 emissions, it needs to assess the economic conse-
quences of global warming, and compare these to the significant
costs associated with reducing fossil fuel use, while simultaneously
adopting alternative energy technologies. There is little evidence to
date that the developed world will have the necessary political will
to institute such widespread changes to halt global warming, partic-
ularly in light of the uncertainty surrounding the economic costs as-
sociated with global climate change.
Many developing nations are reluctant to commit to' emission
controls that may retard their industrial growth. Furthermore, be-
3. Cf NAT'L ACAD. ScI., POL'Y IMPLICATIONS, supra note 2, at 91.
4. See id.
5. See Andrew R. Solow, Is There a Global Warming Problem?, in
GLOBAL WARMING: ECONOMIC POLICY RESPONSES, supra note 1, at 8.
6. See MERETE HEGGELUND, EMISSION PERMIT TRADING: A POLICY
TOOL TO REDUCE THE ATMOSPHERIC CONCENTRATION OF GREENHOUSE
GASES 7 (Canadian Energy Res. Inst. Study No. 36, Jan. 1991).
7. See NAT'L ACAD. Sc., POL'Y IMPLICATIONS, supra note 2, at 9.
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cause they believe that developed nations are largely responsible for
the problem, such developing nations feel that the developed na-
tions should fund action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.'
Global warming, however, is not solely the result of the industrial
practices of the developed nations. Increases in CO 2, N20 and
methane concentrations in the atmosphere are also consequences
of deforestation and agricultural practices in the developing world.9
Population growth also places increasing demands on production of
goods and services, energy and transportation. 0 Both India and
China have significant greenhouse gas emission levels, indicating
that there is a strong correlation between population size, the pro-
cess of industrialization, and greenhouse gas emissions." As nations
become more industrialized and population growth continues un-
abated in many developing nations, the problem of greenhouse gas
emissions will continue to escalate if no emission controls are
implemented.
The fact that the extent, time, and period of global warming are
unpredictable creates a great deal of uncertainty about the possible
economic consequences of the greenhouse effect. 12 These economic
consequences, along with the social, environmental and political
ramifications, need to be understood, or at the very least, assumed,
before a cost-benefit analysis can be undertaken on measures pro-
posed to combat climate change, including the use of international
trade in carbon emission entitlements. While there have been some
simulation models constructed in an attempt to. assess the economic
consequences of global warming and alternative policy initiatives to
mitigate, accommodate or prevent further global warming, these are
8. See T.C. Schelling, Economic Responses to Global Warming: Prospects
for Cooperative Approaches, in GLOBAL WARMING: ECONOMIC POLICY RE-
SPONSES, supra note 1, at 218-19.
9. See Edward B. Barbier et al., Technological Substitution Options for
Controlling Greenhouse Gas Emissions, in GLOBAL WARMING: ECONOMIC POL-
ICY RESPONSES, supra note 1, at 109-10; Solow, supra note 5, at 9-10.
10. See Schelling, supra note 8, at 22.
11. See NAT'L ACAD. OF SC., POL'Y IMPLICATIONS, supra note 2, at 9.
12. See generally United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Intergov-
ernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate
Change on the Work of the Second Part of its Fifth Session, U.N. Intergovern-
mental Negotiating Comm. for a Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 5th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II) (1992).
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not necessarily predictive of the global, national or regional costs
that may be incurred. As most of the studies to date have been frag-
mentary, at best, no general conclusions on the potential economic
impact of global warming either in the United States or abroad are
possible at this time.13
The climate is the product of a complex interaction of variables.
This makes forecasting the impact of climate change particularly
difficult. Some of the projected effects of global warming include
dramatic changes in ecosystems, a rise in sea levels, polar ice cap
warming, changes in rainfall patterns and water supply, and signifi-
cant changes in the availability of arable land.1 4 Although the eco-
nomic consequences are unclear, a cost-benefit analysis clearly must
be undertaken to assess possible intervention strategies to mitigate
or abate the progress of global warming.
Traditional cost-benefit analyses may not only be difficult to
achieve given the level of uncertainty, but also may be incompatible
with the notion of sustainable development. Because we typically
prefer to receive benefits now rather than in the future, the inter-
ests of future generations are often discounted. Future outcomes of
greenhouse gas emissions need to be assigned a value, and the in-
vestment made in reducing these emission levels needs to be as-
sessed. This investment should then be compared to the return on
alternative investments, like alternative mitigation techniques that
may be made or deferred, perhaps for investment in adaptive tech-
nologies, once the results of global warming are felt. Determining
the most cost-effective strategy will be difficult in these circum-
stances. This is also a part of a larger problem, namely the valuation
of non-market costs and benefits associated with global climate
change and the various policy options that may be considered.
Some of the economic models that have been developed to gener-
ate estimates of the costs of global climate change are examined
later in this paper.'5
The success of the Montreal Protocol 16 in limiting production and
13. See Nordhaus, supra note 1, at 44.
14. See Hirofumi Uzawa, Global Warming Initiatives: The Pacific Rim,
in GLOBAL WARMING: ECONOMIC POLICY RESPONSES, supra note 1, at 275.
15. See discussion infra Part III.A.
16. See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989)
[Vol. IX
TRANSFERABLE GAS EMISSION PERMITS
consumption of ozone-depleting substances has fueled hopes that
the international community may be able to implement an effective
international agreement to address the issue of greenhouse gas
emissions and their implications for global climate change. A treaty,
modeled on the Montreal Protocol, could be as successful in deal-
ing with the problem of global warming. The principal difference,
however, between regulating the reduction in CFC and halon use
and regulating the reduction of all greenhouse gas emissions is one
of cost. One of the chief reasons the Montreal Protocol has been ef-
fectively implemented is the availability of alternative, ozone-
friendly, technologies. 7 In contrast, limiting greenhouse gases emis-
sions could prove costly in both absolute and relative terms. Prelimi-
nary cost-benefit ratios (comparing the cost of abatement with pro-
jected benefits of abatement) suggest there is a considerable
difference between the costs and benefits associated with ozone de-
pletion, when compared with global warming.' 8 Whereas projected
benefits from freezing CFC levels were 162 times greater than costs,
benefits from a ten percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions
produced benefits only 7.4 times that of the costs.' 9 This difference
is probably due to the high cost associated with reducing green-
house gas emissions, as well as the uncertainty over the projected
benefits of undertaking these types of abatement efforts. The ques-
tion of monetary valuation of environmental benefits also remains
problematic.
This paper deals with two interrelated concerns over the atmos-
phere: (1) the depletion of the ozone layer due to CFCs and other
ozone-depleting substances; and (2) global climate change issues
arising out of the presence of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
The paper considers the structural, economic and policy considera-
tions surrounding the establishment of international economic in-
[hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. The Montreal Protocol is discussed in
greater detail infra Part III.B.
17. See Barbier et al., supra note 9, at 147-55.
18. See LYNNE M. JURGIELEWICZ, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN THE LEGAL ORDER 209
(1996).
19. See Scott Barrett, Economic Analysis of International Agreements:
Lessons for Global Warming Treaty, in RESPONDING TO CLIMATE CHANGE: SE-
LECTED ECONOMIC ISSUES 134 (OECD, Paris, 1991).
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struments, specifically tradable emission permits. These permits
would be designed to mitigate against the damage caused by ozone
depletion and global climate change and to meet the environmen-
tal goals of greenhouse gas emission reductions. Part I of this Arti-
cle introduces the political and economic debate surrounding the
use of economic instruments to promote climate change. Part II
outlines the current international legal regime for protecting the at-
mosphere. Part III then examines, in greater detail, the principles
of environmental economic damage resulting from global warming
and the use of economic instruments to promote economic and en-
vironmental goals. Finally, Parts IV and V examine the practical ap-
plication of a tradable emission permit scheme in the current inter-
national context, and the key issues that surround the possible use
of economic instruments to secure climate change under interna-
tional law.
I. BACKGROUND
Evaluating the possible introduction of tradable emission per-
mits to promote climate change requires an understanding of
some of the microeconomic tools of analysis most frequently uti-
lized to conduct an economic analysis of legal structure and law.
The study of the interaction between law and economics has
emerged as a discipline in its own right, seeking to explain the
impact of legal institutions and rules in economic terms.20 Any
evaluation of international economic instruments to promote en-
vironmental goals involves, at least to some extent, identifying
the economic consequences of current legal rules and explaining
the possible economic impact of introducing an alternative struc-
ture like the development of an international tradable emission
permit scheme. 21 This paper builds upon an economic evaluation
of environmental policy and proposes that international eco-
nomic instruments may be a successful policy tool that is consis-
tent with both the demands for economic efficiency and meeting
environmental targets. Therefore, it is important to outline some
of the key economic concepts involved before proceeding with
20. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
(1991).
21. See, e.g., JURGIELEWICZ, supra note 18, at 137-41.
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this evaluation. Before proceeding with this evaluation, it is,
therefore, important to outline some of the key economic con-
cepts involved. Section A of Part I examines the atmosphere in
economic terms, the concept of atmospheric pollution as an ex-
ternality and the use of economic instruments, in both a domes-
tic and international context, to correct market imbalances cre-
ated as a result of these externalities. Section B highlights the
current scientific and economic uncertainty surrounding global
climate change.
A. The Economics of the Environment
1. Defining the Atmosphere: Global Commons and Public
Goods
Protecting the atmosphere involves protecting an integral part
of what is termed the "global commons," which is, in a loose
sense, "owned" by all mankind in common.22 The problem with
protecting the global commons is in part a result of the fact that
there are no private property rights attached to it. As Aristotle
notes, "[W]hat is common to the greatest number has the least
care bestowed upon it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly
at all of common interests. ' 23 The atmosphere is not "ownable"
in a private property sense, at least not within the confines of
current legal systems, by any one individual, firm or nation state.
It may, however, be polluted or chemically altered by the harm-
ful actions of individuals, firms, and by extension, nations. The
source of pollution or harm may be hundreds of miles from the
site where the damage is recognized or the cost associated with
the damage is incurred.24 Of increasing concern is not only the
transboundary effects of air pollution, but also the global effects
of activities causing depletion of the ozone layer and global cli-
22. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci.
1243 (1968).
23. ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS AND POETICS 27 (Benjamin Jowett &
Thomas Twining trans., Viking Press, 1957).
24. See, e.g., D.H. Cole, Cleaning Up Krakow: Poland's Ecological Crisis
and the Political Economy of International Environmental Assistance, 2 COLO.
J. INT'L ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 205, 232 (1991).
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mate change. 25 Multilateral cooperation is even more vital for
ozone depletion and global warming because harmful emissions
regardless of origin have the same impact on the global climate.
Thus atmospheric concentrations, particularly where greenhouse
gases are concerned, are essentially uniformly dispersed through-
out the atmosphere.2 6 Given the dynamic nature of the effects of
global warming over time, however, it is even more difficult to
predict the costs that may be incurred in the future as a result of
ozone depletion, global warming, or the efforts undertaken to
halt these processes.
In economic terms, the atmosphere also exhibits all the neces-
sary attributes of a public good. Its consumption by one individ-
ual does not deplete it to the extent that another individual can-
not consume it, although the quality of that consumption may
be affected. A public good is also something that cannot be sup-
plied to one person without being supplied to the public at
large. Thus, the benefits of clean air, climate stability and protec-
tion from harmful ultraviolet (UV) radiation cannot be enjoyed
by one individual or nation to the exclusion of others.217 As a co-
rollary, damage and ultimately the costs of air pollution, global
warming and increased UV radiation are not incurred by only
one individual or nation; they are borne by the public at large.
Imposing a price on a public good is, therefore, very difficult.
While the price may inhibit one individual's consumption or sat-
isfaction, this does not influence the level of consumption or sat-
isfaction of other individuals.28 Typically, private firms will not en-
gage in supplying or trading in public goods because they can
neither exclude non-paying beneficiaries nor derive sufficient
profit to justify investment, unless paid by the government to
supply those goods. 29 Hence, the supply of public goods is nor-
mally provided or subsidized by a government agency.
25. See J. William Futrell, International Environmental Legal Frame-
work, SB79 A.L.I.-A.BA. 1, 6 (1997).
26. See id.
27. Cf WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF EN-
VIRONMENTAL POLICY 201-05 (1975).
28. See id. at 19.
29. See id.
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2. The Concept of Externality
The damages caused by air pollution, global warming or other
human health issues are also externalities of either an individual,
firm, or nation's activities. Externalities are in many ways an elu-
sive concept and there are a number of definitions that could be
adopted.30 A simple, and more appropriate, definition for our
purposes is that an externality exists where there is a divergence
between the private and social cost of an activity such that a firm
or individual does not have to take into account the social cost
or harm that is a by-product of its activities. 31 That is to say, a
firm will decide its level of production without taking into ac-
count the social cost in determining its internal costs of produc-
tion. In this instance there will be production over and above
the socially optimal level, which is the appropriate level of pro-
duction taking into account the social costs. Pollution is the most
often cited example of a harmful, or negative, externality.32 Sul-
fur, carbon dioxide and CFC emissions would all be classified as
externalities, and have been a primary focus of literature discuss-
ing the establishment of an emission permit scheme to improve
air quality, to mitigate against ozone depletion and to slow the
greenhouse effect. 33
The social costs associated with externalities are invariably
borne either by those who are inflicted with the damage or by
governments seeking to regulate or compensate against such
harm.34 While quantifying the extent of these social costs is diffi-
cult at both a national and international level, undoubtedly pol-
lution (in all its forms) imposes a considerable burden on
society.
30. See id. at 14.
31. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1960).
32. See, e.g., Kyle C. Johnson, Letting the Free Market Distribute Envi-
ronmental Resources, 17 WM. & MARYJ. ENVTL. L. 79, 82-83 (1992).
33. See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only
from a National Perspective) for Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DuKE
ENWL. L. & POL'Y F. 225, 273-78 (1997).
34. See David A. Westbrook, Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence, 27
U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 619, 648-51 (1994).
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The theory of externalities suggests that they require a correc-
tive mechanism that the normal market cannot provide because
of an asymmetry between the price to consumers, or victims of
harm, compared to the price to the producers, or source, of the
externality.35 The presence of externalities results in a sub-
optimal allocation of resources. Society experiences a level of
pollution and a quantum of resources allocated to the emission
of harmful substances that is different from that which would be
found if firms had to take into account externalities in their pro-
duction decisions. To remedy this problem, a corrective mecha-
nism must be imposed though, for example, the payment of
taxes, 36 the provision of compensation, 37 or the purchase of "pol-
lution rights. ''38
One of the elements of economic uncertainty associated with
greenhouse gas emissions is, however, also associated with a lack
of data on the possible economic consequences of a "do-
nothing" approach, compared with the consequences of under-
taking particular forms of action. 39 We have very little empirical
evidence upon which to assess. the economic impact of introduc-
ing a corrective mechanism, and thus must rely, at least in part,
on theoretical models to predict the possible consequences of in-
troducing a measure like an emission permit scheme.
35. See David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regula-
tion: Beyond Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 545, 552-
53 (1997).
36. See, e.g., Dana Clark & David Downes, What Price Biodiversity? Ec-
onomic Incentives and Biodiversity Conservation in the United States, 11 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 9, 35-36 (1996) (discussing the use of a Pigouvian
tax, which is "intended to force actors to internalize costs to exceed
marginal private costs").
37. See, e.g., Warren J. Samuels & Nicholas Mercuro, The Role and
Resolution of the Compensation Principle in Society: Part One - The Role, 1
RESEARCH L. & ECON. 157, 179-81 (1979) (discussing the provision of
compensation).
38. See, e.g., J. Yost Conner Jr., Note, Revisiting Cafe: Market Incen-
tives to a Greater Automobile Efficiency, 16 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 429, 448 (1997)
(discussing the use of pollution rights under the Clean Air Act).
39. See JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 66-75 (1971).
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3. Options to Correct Market Failure
An understanding of Pareto-optimality - the allocation of re-
sources, rights and duties so as to benefit all affected parties -
is necessary in order to effectively consider alternative market
correction mechanisms.40 While economic efficiency looks at pro-
duction of a given level of output using the least costly combina-
tion of inputs, distributive efficiency looks at the allocation of
goods and services between consumers and producers. 41 Pareto-
optimality or efficiency indicates that an equilibrium has been
reached whereby no change in production or allocation of goods
and services to consumers could make one consumer better off
without detrimentally affecting another.
In order to determine the optimal price of an externality,
there needs to be an evaluation of the behavioral conditions and
incentives under which producers and consumers will operate.
The mechanism that an economist favors is a price system to en-
sure an efficient allocation of resources. The price that will be
reached in a perfectly competitive market will be the point at
which the buyer and seller will agree to bargain. A Pareto-
optimal price will exist at the point at which any change in price,
which obviously will result in either an increase or decrease in
the supply of the externality, will benefit one individual only at
the expense of another.42 The assumption is made that firms will
seek to maximize profit while individuals will seek to maximize
their utility levels.
The theory behind utilizing economic, as opposed to purely
regulatory, instruments to promote environmental change is pre-
mised on a belief that firms will act to maximize profits, and in
the face of rising costs of pollution, will decrease activities that
result in pollution.43 Purely regulatory instruments have tradition-
ally involved establishing standards, development plans and other
forms of pollution control. An economic instrument utilizes the
market mechanism to achieve similar goals. This distinction is in
many ways artificial, as governments will usually incorporate a
40. See id. at 67.
41. See id. at 67-68.
42. See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 27, at 15.
43. See id. at 25.
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mix of policy approaches including market incentives to meet
objectives and standards. Under Pareto-optimal conditions, emis-
sions of harmful substances would occur only up until the margi-
nal cost to emitters of emitting one more unit of pollution is
equal to the marginal damage resulting from that emission. The
concept of Pareto-optimality must also be viewed in the broader
context of sustainable development, which takes into account not
only present, but also future needs and the potential effect of ac-
tivities on the ability of future generations to consume goods and
services.
The traditional economic approach to the problem of exter-
nalities has been to recommend the imposition of a tax on the
producer or source of the externality that equals the marginal
social damage incurred. 44 This tax, known as a Pigouvian tax, ef-
fectively internalizes the external cost and aligns the incentives,
and hence behavior, of the firm to those affected by the exter-
nality.45 The principal criticism of this approach is that the lack
of information available on the marginal cost function of the
firm and society's marginal social damage function makes it very
difficult to accurately set a tax at the appropriate level.4 6 This ap-
proach also assumes that there is a linear relationship between
damage and emission levels, in other words, as emissions in-
crease, damage levels increase at a corresponding rate, and when
emissions decrease damage will be reduced in direct propor-
tional terms. This may or may not be the case depending on the
nature of the pollutant and its effects. It is possible that there is
a threshold beyond which damage occurs exponentially from in-
creases in emissions, and only reductions that take overall emis-
sions beyond that threshold will have a positive impact of reduc-
ing damage. In light of this uncertainty the choice of regulatory
and economic instruments potentially will have different eco-
nomic consequences. The nature of these consequences will de-
pend on the elasticity of the cost and damage functions, indicat-
ing whether a small change in emission levels has a large impact
on the damage caused to society.
44. See id. at 24-26.
45. See id. at 26-27.
46. See id. at 30-32.
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A tax or similar levy is, however, attractive to. many national
governments in their pursuit of environmental objectives, as it
generates revenues that may be applied to further environmental
measures.4 7 A tax may also have distributional consequences and
may be used as an instrument of government policy to reallocate
resources. Using taxation or other government charges is likely
to be inefficient, given a government's likely insufficient knowl-
edge of any firm's internal costs of production and the value so-
ciety has placed on various elements associated with the use of
public goods. It is possible, however, that the imposition of a
uniform charge per unit of emission will reach a cost-efficient so-
lution as polluters seek to minimize the marginal costs associated
with emitting to equal the uniform charge. 4
A number of countries, including Sweden, Finland and the
Netherlands, have unilaterally imposed carbon taxes.4 9 There
have also been a number of proposals in the United States to
adopt similar fiscal measures.5 0 One of the main objections to
adopting a carbon tax in the United States is its perceived
regressivity and the potential for adverse consequences for lower
income households, for whom expenditures on heating fuel,
electricity and gasoline make up a significant portion of disposa-
ble income.51 In addition, to counteract the regressive nature of
a carbon tax, transfer payments, compensation or other mea-
sures may need to be taken. Furthermore, the macroeconomic
effects, in terms of market inefficiency, unemployment and possi-
ble trade distortions, through the introduction of imports that
are produced in countries with lower production costs as a result
of no carbon tax, are of concern. An international tax would be
difficult to impose and would require management by some
form of supra-national agency.52 This would raise the issue of rev-
47. See id. at 26-27.
48. See id. at 31.
49. See James M. Poterba, Tax Policy to Combat Global Warming: On
Designing a Carbon Tax, in GLOBAL WARMING: ECONOMIC POLICY RE-
SPONSES, supra note 1, at 71, 73.
50. See id. at 74.
51. See id. at 77.
52. Cf V Institutional Arrangements, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1580, 1590-91
(1991).
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enue sharing and it would probably be difficult to obtain na-
tional participation in such a scheme. Similar difficulties are
present when attempting to negotiate a multilateral agreement
to harmonize national laws in order to impose a carbon tax.
As an alternative to direct regulatory control, economists have
also examined the prospect of establishing markets in environ-
mental or pollution commodities to rectify the problems result-
ing from the presence of externalities. The Coasian approach is
to treat the failure of the market system to deal with the pres-
ence of externalities as a failure to adequately define property
rights.5 3 Coase's argument is that polluters and victims will be
able to negotiate an efficient solution to the problem of exter-
nalities, even in the absence of rules of law.54 The preconditions,
however, are that only negligible transaction costs be involved in
the negotiation process, that the market be perfectly competitive,
that private transferable property rights be well defined, and that
individuals seek to maximize their utility.55
A common criticism of the Coase theory is that it makes un-
realistic assumptions. For example, the Coase theory assumes
transaction costs are zero, which even Coase, himself, insists is
unrealistic.5 6 The problem with pollution externalities is that
there are usually a large number of participants affected and/or
large numbers of polluters involved. This renders direct negotia-
tion difficult, thereby precluding a Coasian approach whereby
polluters and those affected directly bargain to reach an optimal
solution to the problem of externality. An alternative is, there-
fore, to design a system whereby direct negotiation occurs within
an institutional framework for the negotiation process in the
trading of emission permits.
53. See Coase, supra note 31, at 19.
54. See id. at 16.
55. See id. at 15.
56. See Bryan Bachner, Regulating Pollution in the People's Republic of
China: An Analysis of the Enforcement of Environmental Law, 7 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 373, 395 (1996); see also EJAN MAcKAAY, ECONOM-
ICS OF INFORMATION AND LAW 49, 57 (1982) (summarizing some of the
criticisms of the Coase Theorem).
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4. The International Context
Utilizing economic instruments to implement environmental
policy in an international context raises some additional issues,
although many of these are not unique to the international
sphere. The first of these issues involves differentiating between
what can be achieved through unilateral action, regional (i.e. bi-
lateral or trilateral) cooperative action and global international
cooperation. A tradable emission permit scheme is only going to
be attractive to members of the global community if it can
achieve benefits or reduce costs beyond what could have been
achieved by a simple bilateral agreement or cooperative action. If
we were to look at two countries, each with a utility function rep-
resenting the combination of emission reductions and benefits
which that country is willing to accept, then we must examine
the area in which both parties can act in cooperation for mutual
benefit.
Nash equilibrium models explore strategic behavior of firms in
oligopolistic situations.5 7 Arguably the international market for
emitters of greenhouse gases operates as an oligopoly, with some
key countries being responsible for a large proportion of the
emissions produced. This means that the Nash equilibrium mod-
els may be able to illustrate the strategic behavior that may occur
in these circumstances.58 A non-cooperative Nash equilibrium will
be achieved when each government considers its neighbors or
other principal emitting countries' levels of emission reductions
and then adopts its own best strategy to maximize its emissions,
to the point at which the marginal costs of emissions are equal
to the national environmental benefits achieved.
Under a cooperative Nash equilibrium model, countries will
seek to maximize their benefits from cooperation and will set
production/emission targets at levels that will maximize the ben-
efits for all parties who have cooperated. 9 Nations will negotiate
with one another to achieve this point only in circumstances
57. See Mark Kelman, Could Lawyers Stop Recissions? Speculations on
Law and Macroeconomics, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1215, 1263 n.16 (1993).
58. See generally GER KLAASSEN, ACID RAIN AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEG-
RADATION: THE ECONOMICS OF EMISSION TRADING 66-75 (1996).
59. See id. at 68.
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where cooperation yields greater benefits than non-cooperation.
A fully cooperative solution would involve nations acting to maxi-
mize global benefits from emission reductions. The viability of
instituting an international tradable emission permit scheme will
depend on whether such a scheme can offer even greater bene-
fits than under a cooperative Nash scenario. The fully coopera-
tive model can be achieved through a tradable emission scheme,
as trading can allow for exchanges to occur recognizing that
some countries have a greater emission reduction burden, and
hence incur costs, than others. Compensation, in the form of
ownership of permits which may be traded for value, is therefore
given to these countries, while the global community reaps the
maximum level of environmental benefits that can be achieved
given technological constraints.
B. Scientific and Economic Uncertainty
Some of the scientific and economic uncertainty surrounding
global climate change has already been discussed.6" By contrast,
however, considerable scientific agreement has been reached
over the effects of ozone depletion, which probably helped solid-
ify international action to halt the production and use of ozone-
depleting substances. 61 The first scientific evidence of the exis-
tence and ramifications of ozone depletion came with the publi-
cation of Molina and Sherwood's findings in 1974.62 This report
explained that CFCs broke down in the upper stratosphere, re-
leasing chlorine that caused a deterioration in the ozone layer.63
Subsequently, the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP), through various working groups, began to formulate an
international response to the problem of ozone depletion. 64 At
this time, manufacturers and consumers of CFCs were concerned
that there was still too much scientific uncertainty over the exis-
60. See discussion supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
61. See ROSALIND TwuM-BARIMA & LAURA B. CAMPBELL, U.N. ENV'T
PROC., PROTECTING THE OZONE LAYER THROUGH TRADE MEASURES: RECON-
CILING THE TRADE PROVISIONS OF THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL AND THE
RULES OF THE GATT 6-8 (1994).
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 11.
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tence, extent and rate of possible ozone depletion. 65 They were
also concerned about the economic uncertainty over the ramifi-
cations of ozone depletion and the development of alternative
technologies to be able decide on future CFC production and
consumption.66
Prior to international agreement, a number of countries had
already taken unilateral action to regulate substances which may
affect the ozone layer, for example, the United States' introduc-
tion of the Clean Air Act of 1977.67 Regulations were introduced
into the United States in March 1978 to phase out CFC use, and
similar steps were taken in Canada, Norway, Sweden, West Ger-
many, the Netherlands and the European Community.68 There
was, however, a significant divergence in standards. While the
United States' CFC production levels decreased to levels which
met only domestic demand, the European Community became a
major supplier of CFCs to the growing market in the developing
nations.69
The 1978 U.S. ban on CFCs decreased emissions originating
from the U.S., but was insufficient to stem the growth in emis-
sions from industrializing nations.70 There was increasing con-
cern that this could overwhelm any reduction in ozone-depleting
substances in the United States and European Community
(UNEP) .71 Unilateral action also exposed U.S. companies to com-
petitive disadvantage as other nations quickly moved to fill the
gap brought about by the United States' preventive actions.
Hence, multilateral action was required to prevent a negative
trade impact on those countries which had taken unilaterar ac-
tion and to prevent the benefits of the reduction in emission
from being eroded by increasing consumption in the developing
world.
65. See id. at 8.
66. See id.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1997).
68. TWUM-BARIMA & CAMPBELL, supra note 61, at 9.
69. See id. at 9-10.
70. See id. at 10.
.71. See id.
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II. THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME FOR PROTECTING
THE ENVIRONMENT
In response to the recognition that the threat of ozone deple-
tion needed to be dealt with on an international level, several
steps were taken. This Part discusses the responses of the inter-
national community. Specifically, Section A of Part II examines
the 1985 Vienna Convention, which was designed to facilitate in-
ternational cooperation in the area of research on the depletion
of the ozone layer. Section B outlines the key provisions of the
Montreal Protocol and its subsequent amendments that regulate
international production and consumption of ozone-depleting
substances. Finally, Section C discusses the Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (including the Kyoto Protocol), while
Section D provides a brief summary of some of the other inter-
national conventions regarding the atmosphere.
A. The 1985 Vienna Convention
In the 1985 Vienna Convention, the participants created a
framework to formalize the process of international cooperation
to undertake research on ozone depletion, and to protect against
activities that threaten the ozone layer.72 The convention does
not outline any specific emission targets or goals. Instead it sim-
ply lists CFCs in an annex with other gases and substances
thought to have the potential to modify the chemical and physi-
cal properties of the ozone layer.73 This convention requires the
parties to take appropriate measures to protect human health
and environment from adverse effects of ozone depletion, and it
establishes a framework for a future protocol to control ozone-
modifying substances.7 4 It is also the principal international
mechanism for promoting research and harmonization of laws
on reducing the emissions of harmful ozone-depleting sub-
stances.7 5 The Montreal Protocol, which is discussed below, is the
72. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,
March 22, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 11,097, 26 I.L.M. 1516 [hereinafter Vienna
Convention].
73. See id. Annex 1, § 4, 26 I.L.M. at 1538.
74. See id. art. 2, at 1529-30.
75. See id. art. 2, §§ 2(a)-(b), at 1530.
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primary instrument for ensuring that these objectives are met
and that specific emission targets are implemented. 76
The organizational structure under the Vienna Convention in-
volves the establishment of a Secretariat ("The Ozone Secreta-
riat") which is responsible for initiating and convening meetings
of the parties, receiving and distributing data on parties' con-
sumption of substances that deplete the ozone layer, and moni-
toring the implementation of the Montreal Protocol."7 The
Ozone Secretariat is also responsible for advising the Executive
Committee of the Multilateral Fund on whether parties are eligi-
ble to receive assistance under Article 10 of the Montreal
Protocol.78
B. The Montreal Protocol and Subsequent Amendments
The Montreal Protocol was signed in September 1987 by repre-
sentatives of virtually all the countries that were significant pro-
ducers and consumers of ozone-depleting substances. 9 These
countries agreed that the protocol would enter into force on the
first of January 1989 only if a minimum of eleven countries, "rep-
resenting two thirds of the 1986 estimated global consumption of
the controlled substances," had ratified it.80 Currently more than
150 countries, including the European Union, representing over
ninety-five percent of the world's consumption of ozone-
depleting substances are parties to the Protocol.81
The key aspects of the Montreal Protocol include:
(1) restrictions on production and consumption of ozone-de-
pleting substances; 82
(2) transfer of production;8 3
76. See generally Montreal Protocol, supra note 16.
77. See Vienna Convention, supra note 72, art. 7, at 1532.
78. See id.
79. See Multinational Pact Aims to Protect Ozone Layer, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 17, 1987, at 6.
80. Montreal Protocol, supra note 16, at 1559-60.
81. See Denise Grady, Asthma Sprays to be Modified, N.Y TIMES, Apr.
23, 1997 at C8.
82. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 16, art. 2, §§ 1-4, at 1552-53.
83. See id. art. 2, §§ 5-7, at 1553.
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(3) restriction on exports and imports of ozone-depleting sub-
stances with non-parties to the Protocol;8 4
(4) special obligations for developing nations;85 and
(5) the establishment of a Multilateral Fund to assist in provid-
ing financial and technical assistance, including the transfer of
technologies, to developing nations. 86
These aspects will be dealt with in turn and will include a dis-
cussion of amendments to these requirements to impose stricter
emission controls that followed the meetings in London and Co-
penhagen. One of the strengths of the Montreal Protocol has
been its ability to adapt to changes in scientific evidence, to im-
pose stricter controls in response to evidence, of ozone layer de-
terioration. Although a great many countries had already unilat-
erally accepted greater reductions in consumption of controlled
substances prior to the amendments made to the Protocol, the
Protocol itself was very responsive to change. This has prompted
a good deal of optimism that other international environmental
agreements will be responsive and flexible enough to adapt to
further changes in scientific knowledge.
1. Restrictions on Production and Consumption of Ozone-
Depleting Substances
The scheme established under the Montreal Protocol requires
the parties to reduce both the consumption and production of a
specified group of CFCs and halons, which are outlined in
Group I and II respectively in Annex A to the Protocol ("con-
trolled substances") .87 Reductions mandated by the Protocol are
expressed in terms of percentages of calculated national levels
(or benchmarks),88 Until it was amended, the Montreal Protocol
required parties to freeze production and consumption of con-
trolled substances at 1986 levels and outlined a timetable for fu-
84. See id. art. 4, at 1554-55.
85. See id. art. 5, at 1555-56.
86. See id. art. 5, § 3, at 1556.
87. See id. art. 1, § 4, art. 2, §§ 1-4, & Annex A, at 1551, 1552-53,
1561.
88. See id. art. 2, §§ 1-4, at 1552-53.
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ture reductions to be made.89 The Protocol specifies, however,
that future adjustments to already-specified controlled substances
would be considered binding on parties.90 The Protocol has to
be formally amended, by a two-thirds majority of the parties, if
further chemicals are to be added as controlled substances.91
Whether the purpose of the Protocol was to control produc-
tion or consumption levels is a contentious issue. While imposing
controls on production alone may be easier, as there are proba-
bly more limited numbers of producers compared to consumers,
there may be a disparity in effect between producers, depending
on their size and capability to accommodate emission controls.
Small producers may be dealt with inequitably if controls are
based on current or historical production levels, and greater
power will be given to the larger producers if production levels
are capped. Those countries that depend on imports have also
argued that they would be starved of substances to meet domes-
tic demand.92 In recognition of these concerns and the possibility
of discouraging countries from participating, the Montreal Proto-
col limited consumption levels by aggregating each party's level
of production and imports of controlled substances and sub-
tracting from this levels of exports.93 The Protocol simultaneously
recognizes the need to meet domestic demands in a transitional
period and allows sufficient incentives for smaller producers or
smaller producing nations to move into alternative technologies.
The first meeting of the parties to the Montreal Protocol took
place in Helsinki in 1989. 94 Although agreement was reached
that CFCs should be phased out by the year 2000 and that
halons should be phased out as soon as possible, no amend-
ments to the obligations under the Protocol were made. 95
89. See id.
90. Id. art. 2, § 11, at 1554.
91. Id. art. 10, at 1554.
92. See TwUM-BARIMA & CAMPBELL, supra note 61, at 15.
93. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 16, at 1553. The Protocol,
however, allowed for the subtraction of exports in calculating consump-
tion level until January 1, 1993.
94. Helsinki Declaration on the Protection of the Ozone Layer,
May 2, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1335.
95. See id.
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Amendments were, however, adopted at the London meeting in
1990.96 These changes can probably be attributed to reports that
the hole in the ozone layer over Antarctica was larger than origi-
nally anticipated. 97 Specifically, at the London meeting it was
agreed that CFC use would be phased out by the year 2000.98 To
achieve this the parties agreed that CFCs would be cut by fifty
percent by 1995 and eighty-five percent by 1997, with additional
time for phaseout by developing countries.99 Furthermore, the
use of halons would also be phased out by 2000 by freezing con-
sumption levels to 1986 levels by 1992, followed by a fifty percent
reduction by 1995.100 The reductions, however, were applied to
non-essential production, but postponed defining "essential" uses
until a later date. 101 Methyl chloroform and additional CFCs were
also added to the list of ozone-depleting substances. 10 2
The fourth meeting of the parties to the Montreal Protocol,
held in Copenhagen in 1992, resulted in further adjustments to
the Protocol to restrict the production and consumption of
ozone-depleting substances.103 At this time the phaseout of con-
trolled substances was already ahead of schedule, and the costs
were already much lower than originally anticipated. 10 4 The re-
port of the Scientific Assessment Panel was released during these
negotiations and strongly indicated that there were greater
ozone holes and higher levels of UV-B radiation than had been
96. Montreal Protocol Parties: Adjustments and Amendments to
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
June 29, 1990, STATE DEP'T No. 91-68, 30 I.L.M. 537, 547-8 [hereinafter
London Amendments].
97. See Thomas H. Maugh III, Ozone Depletion Far Worse Than Ex-
pected Long Awaited Study of Loss in Protective Layer Raises Key Health and
Environmental Concerns, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1988, at 1.
98. See London Amendments, supra note 96, 5, at 540.
99. See id. 3-4, at 539.
100. See id. at 540-41.
101. See id. 4, at 541.
102. See id. at 552-53.
103. United Nations: Adjustments and Amendments to the Mon-
treal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Nov. 23-25,
1992, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-9, 32 I.L.M. 874 [hereinafter Copenhagen
Amendments].
104. See TWUM-BARIMA & CAMPBELL, supra note 61, at 33.
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predicted. 10 5 The findings of the Environmental Effects Assess-
ment Panel (the "EEAP"), which cited evidence of harm to the
marine ecosystem and food chain, was similarly disconcerting.10 6
The report stated that particular emission reductions would be
economically feasible, although there were no adjustments for
products with controlled substances as components. 10 7 This deci-
sion was made because of the difficulty in assessing whether or
not a product has been made utilizing a controlled substance. 08
The adjustments provided for included a 75% reduction in pro-
duction and consumption of CFCs by 1994, with a total phaseout
by 1996.109 Halons were also mandated to be phased out by 1994,
and carbon tetrachloride and methyl chloroform by 1996.110
2. Transfer of Production Levels
Under article 2(5) of the Montreal Protocol, production limits
may be transferred between parties "for the purposes of indus-
trial rationalization" so long as the general production limits
specified under the protocol are not exceeded. 1'
At the London meeting, article 5 was replaced with a provision
encouraging broader trade production limits. 112 The amended ar-
ticle 5 enables parties to trade in a portion of a nation's calcu-
lated level of production, provided that total combined levels of
production for any group of controlled substances does not ex-
ceed the total production limits for the group set out in the
Protocol. 113
105. See id. at 34.
106. See id.
107. See id.; see also Montreal Protocol, supra note 16, art. 1, § 4, at
1551.
108. See id.
109. Copenhagen Amendments, supra note 103, at 876.
110. See id.
111. Montreal Protocol, supra note 16, at 1552.
112. See London Amendments, supra note 96, at 546-48.
113. See id.
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3. Export and Import Restrictions
Under article 4 of the Montreal Protocol, restrictions are also
imposed on trade with non-parties of the Protocol to ensure that
emission reductions are not undermined and to prevent a com-
petitive advantage being obtained by non-party states.114 Article 4
prohibits the export and import of controlled substances with
any non-party state, and provides that within five years of the
Protocol's entry into force the parties would consider banning or
restricting trade in products that are produced with controlled
substances.115 The London meeting amendments extended this
provision to cover controlled substances, listed in annex B to the
Protocol, as well as controlled substances listed in annex A.116 A
procedure for restricting the import and export of products con-
taining controlled substances was also laid out.11 7
4. Special Obligations for Developing Nations
In recognition of the fact that they need to have an extended
time period in which to meet these reductions, developing na-
tions receive special treatment under article 5 of the Protocol, to
facilitate compliance 18 To ensure that the domestic demands in
these developing countries may be met, article 5 of the Protocol
provides for a grace period for the transition to ozone-friendly
technology to occur.119 Where the per capita consumption in a
state is less than 0.3 kilograms, the grace period is ten years. 120
Although developing nations may continue to consume con-
trolled substances within this period, their consumption is not al-
lowed to exceed 0.3 kilograms. 121
It was recognized throughout the negotiations, however, that
although developing nations' per capita consumption was only a
fraction of that in the industrialized nations, their domestic re-
114. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 16, at 1554-55.
115. See id.
116. See London Amendments, supra note 96, at 546.
117. See id.
118. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 16, at 1555-56.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.
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quirements were growing, and if unabated, their emission levels
would increase alongside population growth and moves to indus-
trialize. 22 Hence, it was very important that developing nations
be given an incentive to abide by the Protocol. Otherwise, multi-
lateral action would be undermined if developing nations contin-
ued production and consumption of ozone-depleting substances.
5. Multilateral Fund
The availability of alternative technologies has been critical to
the success of the Montreal Protocol, as the possibility of substi-
tuting ozone-safe technology provided the necessary incentive for
industry to phase out CFCs and halons and lower the compli-
ance costs of the protocol's obligations. 23 The turning point
probably came with DuPont's decision in 1988 to phase out pro-
duction of CFCs. 124 As the world's largest producer of CFCs, Du-
Pont's decision was a significant step in accepting that it was now
technically feasible to use alternatives to CFCs. By 1991 the Tech-
nology and Assessment Panel established under the Montreal
Protocol declared that the innovation to replace CFCs had been
successful, and that it was technically feasible to phase out CFCs
and halons by 1995-97.125
The concern in developing nations over the potential costs of
converting their production facilities to ozone-friendly technolo-
gies and acquiring the technology to assist this process is re-
flected in the technology transfer and multilateral fund provi-
sions of the Montreal Protocol. 26 By 1989, it was disconcerting to
122. See, e.g., Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Nov. 25, 1992, available
in 1992 WL 675170 ([Report of the Implementation Committee]
[T]he Committee has noted with some concern that there
was a trend of increased consumption of controlled sub-
stances, particularly halons, by some Parties operating under
Article 5. Two other problems noted by the Committee were
the pattern of late reporting by many Parties and the prob-
lem of getting accurate population data.).
123. SeeJURGIELEWICZ, supra note 18, at 173.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 174.
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note that only fourteen developing countries had become party
to the Protocol. 1217 If developing nations were not going to par-
ticipate fully to combat ozone depletion, then it was entirely pos-
sible that emission reductions would be undermined and that
production facilities would be established in non-party states. To
prevent this from occurring, the parties agreed at the London
meeting to establish a Multilateral Fund to assist "eligible par-
ties" by providing financial and technical aid, including technol-
ogy transfer, to assist them in meeting the targets under the Pro-
tocol. 128 Between $340-500 million was committed for 1994-96 to
this Fund. 129 However, the much wider issue of disparity between
the industrialized and developing worlds and the implications for
development with increased environmental protection still re-
mains contentious.
6. Non-Compliance Issues
The Montreal Protocol provides three kinds of economic in-
centives to encourage compliance: (a) entry into force require-
ments; (b) control on trade with non-parties; and (c) technology
transfer and research benefits. 130 The Montreal Protocol directly
links trade with environmental controls, and in doing so, demon-
strates not only the profound link between the two, but also the
importance of utilizing trade-based control measures to ensure
compliance. Under article 16, at least eleven countries represent-
ing two-thirds of global consumption of controlled substances
must ratify the proposal before it enters into force. 3' Under arti-
cle 8 of the Montreal Protocol, an implementation committee is
established to consider and report on submissions made to the
Secretariat about the possible non-compliance by parties to the
,127. See Bing Ling, Developing Countries and Ozone Layer Protection:
Issues, Principals and Implications, 6 TUL. ENvTL. L. J. 91, 97 n.34 (1992).
128. SeeJURGIELEWICZ, supra note 18, at 169-70.
129. See id. at 169.
130. See Carol A. Petsonk, The Role of the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) in the Development of International Environment Law, 5
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 351, 367-72 (1990).
131. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 16, art. 16, § 1, at 1559; Pet-
sonk, supra note 130, at 370.
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Protocol. 132 The Secretariat must also be provided with statistics
on production, in order to monitor compliance with the Proto-
col. 133 Although the investigatory and dispute resolution provi-
sions are limited, if negotiation, mediation or conciliation fails,
the dispute can be submitted to the International Court of
Justice.3
C. The Framework Convention on Climate Change
Both the Vienna Convention 135 and the Montreal Protoco' 36
regulate production and consumption of controlled substances
that in addition to being ozone-depleting, are also greenhouse
gases and contribute to the "greenhouse effect." The Montreal
Protocol, however, only deals with certain classes of substances
that are known to have ozone-depleting effects. 137 Therefore, it
provides only an indirect and incremental effect on the emis-
sions of greenhouse gases. A comprehensive and multilateral
greenhouse gas emission regime is still required. Despite its
shortcomings, the Framework Convention on Climate Change
("FCCC"), 138 signed in Rio De Janeiro in June 1992, is the first
crucial step in establishing such a regime. Attention is now being
focused on the institutional structure that may be established
under this framework, including the possibility of implementing
a system of tradable carbon emission entitlements. 3 9 The recom-
mendations of the United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment ("UNCTAD") 40 offer a useful framework for evaluat-
132. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 16, art. 8, at 1556; Petsonk,
supra note 130, at 379.
133. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 16, art. 7, at 1556.
134. See Vienna Convention, supra note 72, art. 11, at 1533-34; see
also Jennifer S. Bales, Transnational Responsibility and Recourse for Ozone
Depletion, 19 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 259, 264 (1996).
135. Vienna Convention, supra note 72.
136. Montreal Protocol, supra note 16.
137. See id. pmbl., art. 1, § 4 & Annex A, at 1550-51, 1561.
138. Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, UN
Doc. A/AC.237/18, 31 I.L.M. 849 [hereinafter FCCC].
139. See id.
140. See generally UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DE-
VELOPMENT (UNCTAD), COMBATING GLOBAL WARMING: POSSIBLE RULES,
REGULATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR A GLOBAL MARKET
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ing the possible implementation of such a system, and is
evaluated in Part IV of this paper.
While this Convention establishes some key principles to ad-
dress global warming, it is deficient in many respects and should
only be regarded as the first step in what will undoubtedly be a
long and involved process of formulating a specific, cost-effective
and efficient response to greenhouse gas emissions.
The FCCC's objective is to promote the stabilization of green-
house gas concentrations at levels that would prevent serious in-
terference with the world's climate system.' 4 ' This objective is not
translated, however, into specific emission targets or levels. In ar-
ticle 3, the FCCC merely outlines some further principles and, in
article 4, broad commitments, which are not readily adopted into
positive policy initiatives. 142 Article 3 recognizes three important
principles: intergenerational interests, sustainable development,
the precautionary principle, and the need to have special re-
quirements for developing nations. 43 The first two of these prin-
ciples are clearly interrelated, and as previously discussed, diffi-
cult to place within a traditional cost-benefit analysis of particular
policy options. The United States asked that cost-effectiveness be
included within the principles established, but this proposal met
with considerable opposition1 44 Nevertheless, the precautionary
principle is expressed in terms of measures that should be cost-
effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible
costs. While only a guide for policy response, it recognizes that
consideration must also be made of the economic consequences
of measures to prevent or mitigate against global climate change.
Article 4 of the FCCC purports to lay down the various com-
mitments to which the parties have agreed.1 45 In practical terms,
however, these commitments are neither targets nor a timetable
IN CO 2 EMISSION ENTITLEMENT, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/GID/8, U.N. Sales No. E.95.II.D.4
(1994) [hereinafter UNCTAD, COMBATING GLOBAL WARMING].
141. See FCCC, supra note 138, art. 2, 31 I.L.M. at 854.
142. See id. arts. 3, 4, at 854-59.
143. See id. art. 3, at 854-55.
144. See Daniel Bodensky, The United States Framework Convention on
Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 451, 453-60, 475-81,
492-96, 499-509, 511-24, 526-27, 554-58 (1993).
145. See FCCC, supra note 138, art. 4, at 855-59.
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for the implementation of specific emission reductions. The par-
ties are asked to prepare national inventories on greenhouse gas
emissions and take action to remove them, and formulate and
implement national programs to address the sources of green-
house gas emissions. 146 Developed nations are also asked to com-
mit themselves to taking special measures to limit emissions of
greenhouse gases and enhance the capacity of their sinks and
reservoirs for the stabilization of such gases. 147 They are also re-
quired to accord financial support to developing nations who are
parties to the Convention to enable them to comply with the
terms of the Convention. 4 How these broad commitments are
to be translated into practice remains to be seen.
Article 4(2) purports to set targets for emission levels to re-
turn, by the year 2000, to "earlier levels" of carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Proto-
col.' 4 9 Needless to say, the uncertainty of what these "earlier"
levels are to be makes these so-called commitments impossible to
implement. At the first conference of the parties to the FCCC,
held in March-April 1995, a proposed protocol was submitted to
reduce CO 2 emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000.150 The United
States opposed this,15 1 although under the Kyoto Protocol' 52 the
United States has now agreed to a seven percent reduction in 1990,
levels of carbon dioxide emissions by 2012.'15 The majority of devel-
oped nations agreed to a five percent reduction, while the Euro-
pean Union committed to an eight percent reduction in emis-
sions. 154 Under the United States' Climate Action Plan, unveiled in
October 1993, the administration had relied on voluntary industry
action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.'55
146. See id. at 855.
147. See id. at 856.
148. See id. at 858-59.
149. See id. at 856-57.
150. See id.
151. See Bodensky, supra note 144, at 514.
152. Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on
Climate Change: Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinaf-
ter Kyoto Protocol].
153. See id. art 3, at 33.
154. See id.
155. See Glenn Wiser, Joint Implementation: Incentives for Private Sec-
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One of the key elements of the FCCC, at least as far as this paper
is concerned, is the joint implementation provisions under article
4(2).156 This provision may be a possible precursor to a tradable
emission permit scheme. Proponents of the convention are now
closely examining the possible use of tradable emission permits and
other economic instruments to curb global warming. 7 The FCCC
is, to a great extent, an evolutionary stage in the process, so there
should be considerable opportunity for evaluating a system for
utilizing international economic instruments to achieve global
warming objectives.
Under article 4(2) (a), the possibility for a transborder approach
to emission reductions is anticipated by what is termed joint imple-
mentation. 58 This provision allows countries to obtain credits for re-
ductions in emissions which can be transferred to another country
to assist it in complying with its emission entitlements. 59 The provi-
sion applies to all those countries listed in annex 1 to the Conven-
tion which have accepted the goal of stabilizing greenhouse gas
emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000.160 Unfortunately, it does
not appear that many of the countries who are party to the FCCC
will be able to meet expected emission reductions to 1990 levels
without severe economic consequences, making compliance un-
likely.'6' Although the Kyoto Protocol marks a significant step for-
ward in achieving emission reductions, it still remains to be seen
whether developed nations will comply with the targets established.
Despite the agreement reached in Kyoto, the Protocol has yet to
enter into force or be ratified by the United States Congress. The
opportunity for joint implementation, however, could provide the
ideal platform for establishing a tradable emission permit scheme.
tion Mitigation of Global Climate Change, 9 GEo. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 747,
748 (1997).
156. See FCCC, supra note 138, art. 4, § 2, 131 I.L.M. at 856.
157. See Adam L. Aronson, From "Cooperator's Loss" to Cooperative
Gain: Negotiating Greenhouse Gas Abatement, 102 YALE L.J. 2143, 2143-44
(1993).
158. See FCCC, supra note 138, at 856.
159. See id. at 856-57.
160. See id. art. 4, § 2(a) & Annex I, at 856, 872.
161. See, e.g., Aronson, supra note 157, at 2154-55.
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A "Clean Development Mechanism" is established under the Ky-
oto Protocol to enable developed nations to finance emission reduc-
tion projects in developing countries. 62 This extension of "joint im-
plementation" could provide the platform for establishing a
tradable emission permit scheme. Article 6 of the Protocol specifi-
cally allows parties to engage in trading of emission reduction
units. 63 Agreement on how an emission trading scheme would be
undertaken has yet to be reached, however. The Clinton administra-
tion has indicated that it supports the introduction of emission trad-
ing to meet its carbon dioxide emission reduction targets.' 64 One
concern over the United States draft plan on implementing emis-
sions trading is that the initial allocation could favor Russia and
other members of the former Soviet Union as a result of economic
decline in these countries. This could lead to a transfer of consider-
able wealth should Russia trade its allocation to other developed na-
tions, most notably the United States, which is likely to be a pur-
chaser of such permits in the event that trading is initiated.
16
Unlike the issue of ozone depletion, which will affect every coun-
try equally, the impact of global warming will be felt differently
across the globe, and the fact that some countries may be less af-
fected than others raises the specter that these countries will be re-
luctant to commit to strict emission controls in the absence of any
foreseeable economic harm. Halting global warming must be viewed
as a long term objective, given that there is not enough scientific ev-
idence to indicate what degree of emission reductions will lessen
the greenhouse effect. It is still unknown whether emission reduc-
tions at this stage can reverse the global warming process. Neverthe-
less, the United States has reiterated its commitment to taking steps
to ensure that all countries adopt measures to reduce greenhouse
gas emission levels and to seek market based solutions that are flexi-
ble and cost-effective. 166
162. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 152, art. 12.
163. See id. art. 6.
164. See John J. Fialka, Breathing Easy: Clear Skies are Goal as Pollu-
tion is Turned into a Commodity, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 1997, at Al.
165. See id.
166. See Richard L. Berke, Clinton Declares New U.S. Policies for Envi-
ronment, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 22, 1993, at Al.
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D. Other International Requirements Affecting the Atmosphere
The possible use of tradable emission permits must also be
viewed within the greater sphere of international protection of
the atmosphere. In addition to the Montreal Protocol and FCCC,
atmospheric pollution is also regulated by the provisions of the
Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution 167 and
the Convention on Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous
Wastes (Basel Convention).1 68 The latter convention will affect
the traffic in ozone-depleting substances and possibly other at-
mospheric pollutants and chemical compounds that affect the at-
mosphere. 169 According to a note issued by the Technical Work-
ing Group of the Basel Convention, controlled substances would
be regarded as hazardous waste and, thus, are subject to restric-
tions on transboundary movements of hazardous wastes as de-
fined under article 1.170 These substances are subject to article
5.4 of the Convention, which bans exports and imports of haz-
ardous wastes unless separate agreement has been reached.' 7'
Many European nations are also subject to restrictions on
emissions of sulfur, nitrous oxides and volatile organic com-
pounds that affect the atmosphere, pursuant to a number of pro-
tocols under the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air
Pollution, which came into force in 1983.172 The United States,
Canada and Mexico are bound under the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to take environmental considerations
into account, and under the side agreement on the environ-
ment, to potentially take much greater action against air pollu-
167. Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution,
Nov. 13, 1979, T.IAS. No. 10541, 18 I.L.M. 1442.
168. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Move-
ments of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, U.N.
Doc. UNEP/WG.190/4, 28 I.L.M. 649, 657 [hereinafter Basel
Convention].
169. See id. at 658.
170. See Basel Convention on the Control of the Transboundary Move-
ments of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 1994 BIANNuAL BuLL. ENVTL.
L. (UNEP) 15.
171. Basel Convention, supra note 168, at 662.
172. See Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution,
supra note 167.
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tion.173 NAFTA also recognizes that in the event of a conflict with
international environmental agreements such as the Montreal
Protocol, these agreements, not NAFTA, will prevail.1 74
In addition to international agreements, countries are also ob-
ligated under general customary law to prevent transboundary
pollution.'7 The precautionary principle is, however, predicated
on a cause and effect analysis which may be impractical in many
instances of atmospheric damage, particularly when looking at
global climate change.
International environmental obligations cannot be viewed in
isolation from international trade. The premise of this paper is,
in many ways, that trade and free market exchange are key com-
ponents to establishing a successful international response to
global warming. The Montreal Protocol demonstrates the poten-
tial success that accompanies the integration of environmental
goals and trade. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 76
and the agreements reached following the Uruguay Round of ne-
gotiations 77 do not directly deal with many of the crucial ques-
tions on how environmental measures are to be treated in terms
of their potential effects on international trade. While there is
recognition that environmental measures may be exempt from
the non-tariff trade barrier provisions where they are necessary
to protect human, animal or plant life or health, or which in-
volve the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, there is
no clear guidance from the World Trade Organization over
which obligations (trade or environment) will prevail in any
given circumstance or where there is a conflict.
173. North American Free Trade Agreement, Sept. 11, 1992, availa-
ble in 1992 WL 721882, *14-15 (N.A.F.T.A.).
174. North American Free Trade Implementation Act, available in
1993 WL 561124, *2 (N.A.F.T.A.).
175. See, e.g., Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905
(1941).
176. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
177. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 1 LEGAL INSTRUMENTS: RE-
SULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
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III. THE PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND THEIR
APPLICATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE
To determine the practicality of tradable emission permits to
combat global warming, it is necessary to examine the latter in
greater detail. Section A of Part III briefly describes some of the
current estimates of the economic damage that may result from
global warming. Section B then deals with the use of economic
instruments to mitigate against the effects of global warming. Fi-
nally, Section C specifically examines the theory and application
of a tradable emission permit scheme as a possible means of pro-
moting international environmental goals.
A. Estimates of Economic Damage Resulting from Global Warming
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to go into detail on
the simulation models that have been developed to assess the po-
tential economic consequences of global warming, a summary of
the disparate results that have been produced helps place the is-
sue of a cost-effective policy action in perspective. One of the di-
lemmas facing policy makers is that the economic costs associ-
ated with global warming may indeed be less than the projected
costs of mitigation and that the benefits of reducing greenhouse
gas emissions may not outweigh the costs associated with reduc-
ing reliance on fossil fuels. The simulation models that have
been developed to date have reached very different conclusions
on the level of damage that may be incurred, the costs associated
with mitigation and the levels of emission reductions that should
be made. 178 The differences in these results are due, in part, to
differing assumptions as to the appropriate discount rate to ap-
ply to future harm from global warming, as to the risk of harm
in the future and on the projected benefits that may accrue from
particular emission reductions. 179 Total damage estimates for the
United States accompanying a doubling in CO2 levels range from
around $61.6 billion in the medium term to $335.7 billion in the
very long term (50-100 years). 180 Simulation models have used per-
178. See Aronson, supra note 157, at 2149-74.
179. See id.
180. See WILLIAM R. CLINE, THE ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL WARMING 131
(Inst. Int'l Econ., 1992).
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centages of GDP estimates, and these hypothesize that the eco-
nomic costs of carbon emission limits could constitute between one
and three percent of world GDP with, in national GDP terms,
China potentially incurring the greatest losses (from eight to ten
percent of GDP). 18l None of these models has appropriately incor-
porated potential rates of technical change in response to the re-
quired reduction in carbon emissions (and hence reliance on fossil
fuels).
B. The Use of Economic Instruments to Promote Economic and
Environmental Goals
The Montreal Protocol provides a conceptual framework for
the international trade in emission permits. The FCCC has also
prompted closer examination of the possible use of tradable
emission permits to mitigate the effects of global warming due to
emissions of greenhouse gases. The Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development ("OECD") and UNCTAD are
both evaluating the practical implications of using a tradable gas
emission permit scheme. 182 The prime motivation at domestic
and international levels for utilizing such a scheme is the belief
that it can achieve a level of greenhouse gas emission reduction
at the least economic cost. Traditionally, the approach at both a
domestic and international level has been to deal with the prob-
lem of emission and air pollution through arbitrary standards en-
forced by a regulatory agency which monitors and controls the
conduct of firms and individuals. 83 One possible advantage of a
tradable emission permit system is that it is by and large self-op-
erating. However, an organizational structure is required to over-
see its operation (particularly at an international level) and to es-
tablish emission levels and initial permit allocation.
When deciding whether to pursue a global policy of reduction
or elimination of greenhouse gas emissions, parties must choose
181. See id. at 340.
182. See Hourcade & Baron, Tradable Permits, in ORGANIZATION FOR
ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS AND
CLIMATE CHANGE 21 (OECD 1993); infra Part V.A.
183. See HEGGELUND, supra note 6, at 34 tbl.2.1, 35-38 (comparing
direct enforcement with market incentive policies).
2951998]
296 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
between relying on unilateral action or free riding on the system.
Unilateral action presumes that international cooperation will ul-
timately follow and that countries may free ride on the reduc-
tions in greenhouse gas emissions. 184 Global warming ultimately
may affect all nations in the long-term, and some countries have
been willing to undertake unilateral emission reductions, thus
making the free-rider problem potentially less important in prac-
tice than in theory.'85
It may be, however, that for some nations there exists a situa-
tion of "cooperator's loss." Cooperator's loss is a term that refers
to a situation where the total benefits of cooperation outweigh
the total benefits of non-cooperation, but for one of the players
total non-cooperation remains a more attractive alternative than
total cooperation.1 6 This may very well exist for nations such as
the United States that are heavily reliant on fossil fuels and who
may benefit more from not cooperating in reducing total emis-
sion levels given the large costs involved in substituting alterna-
tive energy sources. Countries like the United States may also be
less affected by global warming, or at least better able to respond
and adapt to the possible consequences of global warming.18 7
There is evidence, however, that some countries, particularly
island nations, will be more significantly affected, and that there
may be considerable regional variations in the impact felt from
global warming. l88 As a result, countries predicting that they will
be less affected by global warming will undertake a cost-benefit
analysis and decide that it is more cost-effective to wait and rec-
tify the problems associated with global warming than to incur
costs now to prevent those problems. The finding of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences in its 1991 report is illustrative. Ac-
cording to the report, "[p]eople in the United States will have
no more difficulty adapting to such future changes [in the pro-
184. Cf CLINE, supra note 180, at 325-32 (discussing the free rider
problem).
185. See id. at 328.
186. See Aronson, supra note 157, at 2151.
187. Cf id. at 2159-60.
188. Cf Samuel Preatt Menefer, "Half Season"." The Impact of Sea
Level Rise on International Law and Policy, 9 UCLA J. ENVIL. L. & POL'Y
175, 178 (1991).
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jected rate of climate change] than to the most severe conditions
of the past, including the dust bowl." 189 This report suggested
that the rate of technological change and capital investment in
research and development was such that adaptation was a more
cost-effective solution than implementing abatement measures.
Still, there remains such uncertainty on the ramifications of
global warming and its economic consequences that it is proba-
bly ill-advised to make such findings at this stage. Nevertheless, it
reveals the very real attitude of "wait and see" rather than acting
on uncertain and imperfect scientific evidence at a time when
the economic consequences of undertaking a particular form of
action are far from clear.
In addition to these concerns, there is still the issue of resolv-
ing developing countries' participation in an international effort
to curb global warming. Although the developed world accounts
for approximately seventy percent of global carbon dioxide emis-
sions,190 there are indications that countries such as China will
become increasingly more reliant on fossil fuels as population
and economic growth continues. 191 Oil-producing nations will
also be affected by any global move to cut fossil fuel and associ-
ated carbon dioxide emission levels.
International cooperation is far more likely to occur when
countries perceive that the marginal benefits of abatement (that
is the benefit of reducing one more unit of emission) will rise
sharply as emissions increase. This will, perhaps, provide the nec-
essary incentive for change. This is probably best illustrated by
the success of the Montreal Protocol, where the perceived bene-
fits of reducing ozone depletion were clear and immediate.
While it is clear that where externalities are present each country
will have an incentive to reduce its own damage, there will be an
incentive to act jointly only where it is clear that more damage
reduction will result from international cooperation than from
unilateral action. In the absence of international cooperation,
each country will act to meet its own costs of abatement and re-
189. NATIONAL AAD. SC., POL'Y IMPLICATIONS, supra note 2, at 47.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 65.
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duce emissions to the point where the marginal cost of abate-
ment equals the marginal benefits from abatement.
The slope of both the marginal benefit and marginal cost
curves will dictate whether international cooperation provides
significant gains over unilateral action. The problem with assess-
ing policy action to halt global warming is that the benefits are
not yet quantifiable, even though it is probably clear that inter-
national action is required, because greenhouse gases are dis-
persed uniformly throughout the atmosphere. As a result, unilat-
eral reductions, unless they constitute a significant percentage of
global emissions, may not result in expected benefits if other
countries continue or indeed increase their emissions.
C. Tradable Emission Permits: Theory and Application
A theoretical assessment of a tradable emission permit system
requires a number of assumptions and an examination of the
market mechanism that should operate, given these assumptions,
to produce an environmentally and economically efficient result.
A basic assumption is that we can identify an appropriate overall
(national/bilateral/multinational) emission level which may then
be divided into units and traded between producers. The level of
pollution/emission is thus determined by the distribution of ex-
isting permits among those who actually use them, and in the-
ory, those holding the permits unused in order to preserve air
quality. The theory of tradable emission permits creates a market
for emission as externalities, and grants a quasi property right to
the commons by granting what is, in effect, a license to
pollute.1 92
Distribution of the benefits from emission permit trading de-
pends on the gap between the marginal costs associated with ac-
tivities that produce emissions. 193 There probably will be a ten-
dency for prices to fluctuate as firms modify their behavior and
their purchases of tradable emission permits in response to
changing marginal cost structures and the availability of alterna-
tive technologies. 94 The bargaining power of individual emitters
192. See HEGGELUND, supra note 6, at xiv, xvi, 19-32.
193. See id. at 22-26, 24 figs.2.1 & 2.2.
194. See id. at 25.
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should not be underestimated, and if there is significant market
power or barriers to trade, there may be a reduction in the effi-
ciency with which the market for tradable emission permits
operates. 95
Some of the key conditions for a successful tradable emission
permit system are:
(1) Sufficiently large numbers of emitters in the trading mar-
ket to ensure that it is competitive and that emitters cannot en-
gage in strategic behavior or manipulation of the market in
terms of wither allocation, distribution or price of permits;196
(2) Divergence between emitters in the costs of complying
with the overall emission levels;197
(3) Minimal restrictions placed on the transferability of per-
mits, enabling the market to achieve the lowest cost of compli-
ance outcome;198
(4) Uniformly mixed pollutants rather than specific emissions
that only cause damage in specific areas and for a specific time
period; 199
(5) No auctioning of permits as an initial allocative mechanism
which otherwise may lead to increased costs to emitters and ne-
gate the cost savings which may accompany the proper operation
of the tradable emission permit system;2°° and
(6) Free allocation of permits, which provides an incentive to
trade, but is also an instrument of wealth transfer.20 1
A tradable emission permit system may also have advantages in
that, unlike a tax, no regulatory body has to assess the appropri-
ate tax rate in circumstances where there is both scientific and
economic uncertainty.20 2 A tradable emission permit system may
have the flexibility to accommodate changes in economic
growth, inflation and changes in technology, and it will also pro-
195. See, e.g., id. at 30-31 (non-competitive behavior).
196. See id. at xv.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id. at xvi.
202. See id. at 41-43.
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vide an incentive for innovative technology development. 20 3
There is, however, no direct control imposed by the tradable
emission permit system, unlike a tax, and so it may be less re-
sponsive as a mechanism for controlling emission activities.
IV. PRACTICAL APPLICATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF A TRADABLE
EMISSION PERMIT SCHEME
To ensure a successful implementation, several aspects of any
proposed permit trading system should be examined and clari-
fied. Section A of Part IV provides an overview of experiences to
date, both in the United States and abroad, with the use of trad-
able emission permits. Section B expands upon these exper-
iences to highlight some of the key issues involved in establishing
a tradable emission permit scheme.
A. Experience to Date in the Use of Tradable Emission Permits
Experiences in the United States suggest that a tradable emis-
sion permit system can be an effective means of achieving envi-
ronmental change.204 Several issues need to be addressed, how-
ever, to ensure a successful implementation. These include the
determination of baseline and emission reduction levels which
define the emission units available, because where there is uncer-
tainty there is less incentive for emitters to participate in the sys-
tem. In addition, the transaction costs associated with trading
should be carefully assessed, as well as the extent to which trad-
ing is restricted as a result of these costs. Such restrictions may
have a significant impact on the success of the system, as they
may hinder the competitiveness of the market.
The United States has used tradable emission permit systems
to minimize levels of air pollution.2 5 It is also evaluating the use
of a tradable emission permit system to meet obligations under
the FCCC to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. The United States
already has an emissions trading system in place to meet obliga-
tions under the Montreal Protocol, with respect to CFC produc-
203. See id.
204. See id. at xvii-xviii.
205. See id. at 53.
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tion and consumption. 20 6
The most successful examples of trading appear to have been
under the Lead Trading Program for concentrations of lead in
gasoline. 20 7 This program Was instituted in 1985 and terminated
in 1987.208 Estimates suggest a savings of around $228 million oc-
curred through the utilization of the Lead Trading Program.
20 9
The success of this program reflects the unrestricted competition
which was present and the large percentage of participation by
the refineries in the United States. A less successful example of
utilizing tradable permits is the Fox River tradable discharge per-
mit scheme. 210 Because it was hindered by a small number of par-
ticipants and a narrowly defined market area, only one trade oc-
curred in six years of operation and the projected cost savings
were never realized.211
For a number of years, the United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) has operated a system of emission trading
in sulfur dioxide, carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, ozone and
lead.212 The system is a combination of marketable permits and
direct control measures. Some disagreement exists, however, con-
cerning the success of these programs, but the number of trades
that took place was lower than expected.213 Such results may have
been due to restrictions imposed on trading, as well as the un-
certainty over the value of the rights issued to participants.
The CFC and halon tradable permit system was implemented
to meet the requirements under the Montreal Protocol. 214 In
1990, in order to combat acid rain, trading in sulfur and nitrous
oxide emissions was commenced as part of a program under the
Clean Air Act. 215 Initial estimates suggest that the introduction of
trading in sulfur dioxide emission permits has led to a thirty per-
206. See HEGGELUND, supra note 6, at 58-59.
207. See id. at 52.
208. See Hourcade & Baron, supra note 182, at 21.
209. See HEGGELUND, supra note 6, at 52.
210. See id. at 51-52.
211. See id. at 52.
212. See KLAASSEN, supra note 58, at 131.
213. See id. at 134.
214. See id. at 141.
215. See id. at 145.
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cent drop in the level of sulfur dioxide emissions since trading
was imlemented in 1995.216 Estimates on the value of the world-
wide market in carbon dioxide emission permits range from $10
to $20 billion. 217
Many of the European nations have also been experimenting
with the use of tradable permits to promote environmental goals.
Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands have all introduced
forms of permit/quota schemes, but these systems have not been
full trading schemes.28 The Second Sulfur Protocol may provide
an opportunity to introduce such a scheme, however, and Eu-
rope will probably look to the American experience for guidance
in this field.219
B. The Key Issues
1. Establishing Target Emissions
The lack of agreement on target emission reductions clearly
presents a significant obstacle to implementing any form of emis-
sion permit trading. Ideally, targets and timetables for future
targets should be specified at the optimal level, given current in-
formation on the foreseeable consequences and costs of particu-
lar levels of greenhouse gas emissions. 220 It is highly unlikely,
given the current uncertainties, that an optimal level of green-
house gas emissions can be agreed upon in both developed and
developing nations in the near future, despite the advances
made in Kyoto. The initial targets are important for any tradable
emission permit scheme because they will be used as the bench-
mark for the initial allocation of permits and any subsequent re-
issues that may be made. The difficulty with implementing a re-
duction of emission levels over time is that the projected goals
must be specific enough to enable a reallocation or a reduction
in the number of permits available. Such goals must, however, be
balanced against the economic benefits of having a trading sys-
216. See Fialka, supra note 164.
217. See id.
218. See KLAASSEN, supra note 58, at 157-66.
219. For a discussion of the Second Sulfur Protocol, see id. at 274-
76.
220. See HEGGELUND, supra note 6, at 20-22.
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tem which involves property rights of value that may be traded.
Experience in the United States suggests that if permits are sub-
ject to uncertainty in terms of future reductions/reallocations,
and hence changes in value, trade is unlikely to occur.221
Any proposal for the implementation of a tradable emission
permit scheme is contingent on the ability of the global commu-
nity to reach an agreement on baseline and target emission
levels. Given the range of sources of greenhouse gas emissions,
the impact of emission reductions will be affected by a number
of economic sectors. If uncertainty exists or inappropriate levels
are set, the economic and social benefits of trading will not ulti-
mately be achieved. The absence of any previous regime to regu-
late greenhouse gas emissions means there is no baseline from
which international trading may operate. Not only must the in-
ternational community reach agreement concerning emission
levels, but, in addition, those levels must be monitored effectively
to ensure that compliance can be enforced.
2. Allocation of Permits
The allocation of emission permits is undoubtedly one of the
most contentious issues because the initial allocation will consti-
tute a transfer or distribution of wealth with significant conse-
quences in terms of possible gains from trade, as well as market
concentration implications. Allocation could occur in a number
of ways. For example, some schemes would require a fee or
price, while others would be initially distributed free of charge. A
free distribution may be based on a per capita, historical produc-
tion, GDP or current emission levels. Allocation based on histori-
cal production levels for emissions will favor developed nations,
particularly the United States. Allocation based on GDP is also
biased against developing countries while population levels
would favor some countries such as China and India over smaller
countries which may nevertheless be reliant on greenhouse gas
emitting technology. Favoring those countries with high popula-
tion growth does not sit easily with current notions of sustainable
development 22
221. See id. at xvii.
222. See CLINE, supra note 180, at 353.
19981
304 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
Allocation by auction to the highest bidder necessarily allows
those firms or governments who can pay the most to successfully
bid for permits. Even an allocation at a specified price may ham-
per the possibility of efficient trading, because there is no mech-
anism to prevent purchasing to be made which renders an initial
allocation incompatible with future emission requirements.
Many of these proposed allocative mechanisms would be unac-
ceptable both to the developed and developing nations. The dif-
ficulty therefore lies in making an equitable allocation that will
also provide a sound basis for economic trading to occur. Coun-
tries which are large emitters of greenhouse gases must be given
the opportunity to minimize their costs and shift to cleaner tech-
nologies, and developing nations must be able to tradeoff indus-
trialization with the benefits of reduced emission levels, and
hence must not be denied the opportunity to benefit from trade
in emission permits.
3. Parameters of Trading
Experience in the United States suggests that it is important
for trade to be as competitive and free as possible. 223 The imposi-
tion of strict requirements on when trade may occur will defeat
the purpose of having an emission permit system, which is to en-
able market forces to produce the optimal and efficient result.
One of the criticisms of regulatory approaches is that they lock
industries into a current emission regime when further reduc-
tions would be possible, provided there was sufficient economic
incentive. 224 To place undue restrictions on trade would similarly
lock industries into a current technological mindset, without giv-
ing the incentive to reduce costs and shift to alternative technol-
ogies guided by the profit- maximizing objective.
4. Intranational and International Trading of Permits
Instituting a tradable emission scheme can occur at two levels
within the international context: at a national level, to meet in-
ternational obligations, and at an international level, to meet in-
223. See supra Part W.A.
224. Cf HEGGELUND, supra note 6, at 71.
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ternational targets. The level at which the trading system is to
operate must, therefore, be addressed. Governments are clearly
the relevant parties to international agreements, and would
therefore take primary responsibility for establishing and success-
fully implementing a permit trade system. The difficulties with
developing an appropriate institutional framework for interna-
tional trading cannot be underestimated. While some countries,
such as the United States, are well-equipped to undertake na-
tional trading to meet international emission requirements, many
less developed nations do not have the legal, political or finan-
cial structure available to make trading feasible at a national
level. As outlined below, proposed international trading depends
upon the ability of the international community to agree upon a
supranational body to oversee trading and to monitor enforce-
ment. How this would interact with domestic laws and enable
free trade between firms operating under very different legal re-
gimes remains to be seen. National governments may also have
the necessary flexibility to be sensitive to local conditions affect-
ing trade.
V. DEVELOPING A TRADABLE EMISSION SCHEME UNDER THE
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
Instituting an emission permit scheme within the current inter-
national environment is undoubtedly a difficult task. The United
States and other significant emitters of greenhouse gases seem
reluctant to provide the global leadership that is required to im-
plement the required large-scale emission reductions.225 There is
also such a degree of uncertainty over the effects of global warm-
ing and the administrative practicability of utilizing economic in-
struments in the international sphere that it is hard to determine
a feasible course of international action. The benefits, however,
of utilizing an emission permit scheme suggest that it is an ap-
propriate mechanism for introducing cost-effective emission con-
trols.226 Section A of Part V specifically addresses the'recommen-
dations made by UNCTAD concerning possible implementation
of a tradable emission permit scheme built upon the joint imple-
225. See discussion supra Introduction.
226. See discussion supra Part III.
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mentation provisions contained within the Framework Conven-
tion of Climate Change. Section B examines the possible use of
these joint implementation provisions as a springboard for an in-
ternational tradable emission permit scheme focused on reduc-
ing greenhouse gas emissions.
A. UNCTAD Recommendations
The UNCTAD has devised a three-stage process for the possi-
ble implementation of a tradable program in CO 2 entitlements.227
This builds upon the FCCC joint implementation provisions 228 and
possibly offers a working model worth considering. The first stage is
the joint implementation stage to meet the emission reductions that
parties have already committed to (at least in theory) in the FCCC
and the Kyoto Protocol.229 UNCTAD recommends that nations be al-
lowed to satisfy their emission reduction requirements by a combi-
nation of domestic emission reductions and international offsets
against other countries that emit greenhouse gases, to ensure that
global emission targets are met.230
The second stage in the process would introduce further reduc-
tions in emissions over time, with each state receiving a number of
certified entitlements equivalent to their 1990 emission levels. 23'
Trading between emission sources can then take place. In the third
stage, the Culmination Stage, entitlement trading would be ex-
panded in three ways.2 32 More countries would opt in, and there-
fore, both the number of participants and the number of trades
would increased.2 33 Furthermore, the coverage of greenhouse gas
sources would expand to include not only C0 2, but all greenhouse
gases.234 The UNCTAD report highlights some of the key challenges
involved in introducing such a three-phase system: (1) leadership is
227. See UNCTAD, COMBATING GLOBAL WARMING, supra note 140, at
9-60.
228. See id. at 3.
229. See id. at 9.
230. See id.
231. See id. at 10.
232. See id. at 11.
233. See id.
234. See id.
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needed at all stages from the principal emitting nations,235 and (2)
strategies must be developed to resolve the tensions between market
efficiency and environmental protection.236 The report cites the
need to adequately monitor237 and enforce emission reductions ,238
and to have sufficient infrastructure to encourage trading activity.239
The committee recommends that obligations to meet emission re-
ductions should be placed upon national governments, rather than
firms.240 This would overcome many of the difficulties within inter-
national law in regulating the actions of firms and individuals.
Hence, the primary responsibility for fulfilling international obliga-
tions would rest with the participating nations. UNCTAD also rec-
ommends that the bulk of the administration and monitoring occur
at a national level, as the information is more readily available.2 4'
The report concludes that a fully operational international trading
program that relies not on participating nations' policies but on
pure competitive trade between emission sources is probably not
feasible at this time.242 As this Article has indicated, competitive
trade is the optimal solution and perhaps one that should not be so
easily discounted, although the difficulties in instituting such a
scheme are readily apparent.
B. Joint Implementation as a Springboard for a Tradable Emission
Scheme
As indicated by the UNCTAD recommendations, joint imple-
mentation may provide the ideal opportunity to examine and de-
velop the market architecture necessary for a tradable emission
permit scheme.243 While this is by no means an easy feat, the pre-
cedent set by the Montreal Protocol offers hope that a system
235. liSee id. at 53.
236. See id. at 54.
237. See id. at 6-7, 21-35.
238. See id. at 7, 21-49.
239. See id. at 63-101.
240. See id. at 44-46.
241. See id. at 14-15 (discussing administrative certification), 32-34
(discussing monitoring).
242. See id. at 51-52.
243. See generally UNCTAD, COMBATING GLOBAL WARMING, supra
note 140.
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could eventually be designed to facilitate the trade in "environ-
mental commodities." 244 Joint implementation is, however, only
in its formative stages, and there remain a number of issues and
concerns that have yet to be reconciled. Joint implementation al-
lows countries with high costs of pollution abatement to invest in
abatement measures in a country which has lower costs and to
receive credit for the resulting emission reductions245 or other
environmental benefit. Both the Montreal Protocol and the
FCCC have set precedents in terms of the application of joint im-
plementation and provide a potential foundation for global part-
nerships (ideally both between governments and firms) to
achieve environmental change and sustainable development.2 46
Whether significant cost savings can occur through joint imple-
mentation depends on the marginal costs of abatement for the
participants involved. There are concerns, however, that these
costs may not be sufficiently known and that transaction costs as-
sociated with joint implementation projects will be high.
The lack of experience with joint implementation makes it dif-
ficult to assess its national and global economic and environmen-
tal impacts or whether it can be the formative stage for a trad-
able emission program. It is commonly perceived that joint
implementation will involve the developed world trading off
their own obligations against subsidizing projects in the develop-
ing world. 247 Greenpeace, for example, criticizes joint implemen-
tation as merely an attempt by developed countries to obtain
emission credits as a means of evading their own obligations. 248
As a result, Greenpeace recommends that joint implementation
be allowed but that no credits be issued to the donor country.249
Just as allocation of permits is the crux of the problem in imple-
244. See generally ONNO KUIK ET AL., JOINT IMPLEMENTATION TO CURB
CLIMATE CHANGE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 8 (1994).
245. David Pearce, Joint Implementation: A General Overview, in THE
FEAsIBILITY OF JOINT IMPLEMENTATION 27 (Catrinus J. Jepma ed., 1995).
246. See id.
247. See Bill Hare & Arjetle Stevens, Joint Implementation: A Critical
Approach, in THE FEASIBILITY OF JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 245, at
81.
248. See id.
249. See id.
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menting a tradable emission permit scheme, obtaining or receiv-
ing credit is the crux of the problem with joint
implementation. 250
The issue of banking emission credits against future polluting
activity also remains controversial. It is unlikely that nations will
participate if no benefits are accorded to them, and joint imple-
mentation offers an ideal opportunity for projects to be con-
ducted in countries which could not otherwise afford to conduct
them. Many host nations may, however, be reluctant to relin-
quish their sovereignty over resources, and joint implementation
may become part of a greater concern over inequities in trade
and the regulation of foreign investment.
Despite the concerns that have been raised, joint implementa-
tion projects have already been commenced. The first agreement
was reached between Norway, Poland and Mexico through the
Global Environment Facility.251 Norway has agreed to utilize the
revenues generated from its carbon tax to provide financing for
carbon-reducing projects in Mexico and Poland.25 2
CONCLUSION
Joint implementation potentially provides an opportunity to
develop the market infrastructure necessary for an international
market in tradable emission permits, and possibly other environ-
mental commodities. While it is beyond the scope of this article
to examine joint implementation in any detail, it is important to
note that this sets the precedent for national, and potentially pri-
vate, involvement in reducing global greenhouse gas emissions. It
may be a foundation for discussions on the difficult issue of allo-
cation of permits and parameters of trade for a future emission
scheme. Based on past experience, any tradable emission
scheme, whether in emission credits or emission permits, needs
to be as competitive as possible, to enable the optimal situation
to be achieved. Of course, this must be balanced against the en-
vironmental imperatives of the time. The principal difficulty will
be convincing the international community that market forces,
250. See KUIK ET AL., supra note 244, at 40-45.
251. See Pearce, supra note 245, at 20.
252. See id.
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rather than regulation, should prevail. Obviously, regulation is
required on some key issues, such as establishing baseline and
emission reduction targets, because the market cannot operate
without the key environmental parameters being established.
These are difficult but not insurmountable hurdles. The Kyoto
Protocol opens up the possibility that a viable international trad-
ing scheme could be implemented. The most difficult hurdle to
overcome will be the political lethargy, in both the developed
and developing worlds, to adopt global measures to combat cli-
mate change.
